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Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the new states of Central Asia have been
obliged to adjust their institutions to new symbolic frontiers and to take into account the
independence they achieved in 1991. Both universities and Academies of Sciences have
been called to reconsider their research policies and to orient them in order to respond to
emerging national issues. The building of national narratives is a particularly relevant
object of study in observing the various modes of legitimization of the Central Asian states
and the scientiﬁc instruments they deem necessary for their political validation. The aim of
this paper is to overcome the apparent, albeit actual, character of a number of changes that
have taken place in Uzbekistan since 1991, in order to demonstrate the continuity of
personal, institutional, and intellectual lines uniting contemporary research to that con-
ducted during Soviet period. The preference accorded to ancient history, the praise of the
originality and long heritage of the people, and an obsession with ethnogenesis, all are
rooted in the contemporary narrative of the previous regime. They invite a reconsideration
of the past two decades in a more nuanced manner and a rereading of the Soviet past in
order to understand the process of building the nation-state, which has now been
underway for more than half a century.
Copyright  2010, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Produced and
distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.The call to national consciousness is impossible without
implementing projects of collective self-deﬁnition, in
which managing discourse on the past is a main objective.
Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the new states
of Central Asia have been obliged to adjust their institutions
to new symbolic frontiers and to take into account the
independence they achieved in 1991. Both universities and
Academies of Sciences have been called to reconsider their
research policies and to orient them in order to respond toInternational Studies,
Research Center, HanyangUniversemerging national issues. These reforms put at stake the
future of academic elites, their ability to maintain research
independent from the political authorities and to integrate
into international intellectual and institutional networks. It
is questionable whether visual symbols, such as statues of
Marx and Lenin, and their replacement by Tamerlane and
his successors signify memorial rupture and the evolution
of identity issues in Uzbekistan. These various collective
references sometimes overlap more than they contradict
one another. While some elements seem fairly innovative,
such as the cult of Timur, others equally signiﬁcant but less
visible, such as the cult of the historical continuity of the
nation, already existed during the Soviet period.
The building of national narratives is a particularly
relevant object of study in observing the various modes of
legitimization of the Central Asian states and the scientiﬁc
instruments they deem necessary for their political
ity. Produced and distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved. Peer reviewunder
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the ancient presence of the nation on its territory is a key
element of ofﬁcial discourse. Historical analysis of this
phenomenon takes on an essentialist tone, in which ethnic
groups exist as objective and natural facts that inevitably
resulted in contemporary nation-building, retroactively
projecting into the past the existence of the Uzbek nation.
Autochthonic issues are seen as particularly crucial in
Uzbekistan, as there is long-standing competition with the
Tajiks for this Turkic people and its deeply Persian-inﬂu-
enced culture. Retracing the genealogy of the contempo-
rary historical analyses therefore invites an equation
between the development of academic disciplines and
their political environment. Did accession to independence
require Uzbekistan to rethink the genesis of the nation and
especially of the scholarly disciplines related to it?
The aim of this paper is to overcome the apparent, albeit
actual, character of a number of changes that have taken
place in Uzbekistan since 1991, in order to demonstrate the
continuity of personal, institutional, and intellectual lines
uniting contemporary research to that conducted during
Soviet period. The preference accorded to ancient history,
the praise of the originality and long heritage of the people,
and an obsession with ethnogenesis, all are rooted in the
contemporary narrative of the previous regime. They invite
a reconsideration of the past two decades in a more
nuancedmanner and a rereading of the Soviet past in order
to understand the process of building the nation-state,
which has now been underway for more than half
a century. On the problematic questions of identity and
their scholarly, particularly ethnological, justiﬁcations,
independence is neither a beginning nor birth, but rather
a continuation.1 Interview with D. Alimova, Institute of History, Tashkent, February 19,
2004.Sciences subjected to political pressure
Post-Soviet changes have profoundly impacted the state
of research in Uzbekistan. The disappearance of former
Soviet generations, the mass exodus of scholars with the
most competitive and “exportable” subjects, the sudden
decline of the profession’s social prestige, the avoidance of
the vocation by young people, the lack of means to publish
research, and the difﬁculty of accessing books in Western
languages did not help the creation of academic networks
anchored in major ﬁelds of contemporary thought. Finan-
cial issues have become central to conducting research and
the decline in state support is having a disproportionate
effect,with the sole and recent exception of Kazakhstan. The
interaction between academic spheres, weakened by the
deterioration of their symbolic and material status, and the
development of a new narrative on the nation cannot be
understood without taking into account a third major actor,
political power. In societies only somewhat affected by
Gorbachev’s liberalizations in the 1980s, andwhose current
leaders have fallen back on increasingly paternalistic and
authoritarian methods, political inﬂuence on the intellec-
tual realm is crucial. The authorities have indeed assumed
the right to write history, creating “places of memory” for
the nation-state under construction and calling for the
development of a new jargon of political science, focusingon the independence of 1991 as the only relevant object of
study, and as a ‘natural’ end for centuries of history.
In Uzbekistan, control of history by political authorities
increased after 1998. That year, President Islam Karimov
convened a conference with the Uzbek historians, after
which the Cabinet of Ministers issued a decree “on the
improvement of the activity of the Institute of History of
the Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan” (O sover-
shenstvovanii deiatel’nosti Instituta istorii ANRU). The inﬂu-
ence of political authorities on the discipline of history is
afﬁrmed in the ﬁrst point: “The Cabinet of Ministers
decrees that the main purpose of the activity of the Insti-
tute of History is the study of the authentic history of the
Uzbek people and their state” (Decret no. 315, 1998). Every
semester, the institute is required to organize a seminar on
the history of Uzbek statehood, to collect information on
the history of Uzbek people, its government, and its eth-
nogenesis, and to advance archaeological knowledge and
research on local written sources (manuscripts). In addition
to these policy directives given to researchers, it should be
noted that other national groups were mentioned only
once in the decree and that, far from the discourse on an
alleged civic Uzbekistani identity, the contemporary state
continues to be presented in the text as that of only the
Uzbek people.
Apparently dissatisﬁed with the stagnation at the Insti-
tute of History, through the decree the president offered it
important material resources, including the creation of the
journal O’zbekiston Tarihi as well as improvedmanagement.
In 1998, Dilorom Alimova was appointed deputy director
and then, sometime later, the director of the Institute. A
specialist during Soviet times on the issue of women’s
liberation in the Soviet Union, she shifted to the study of
Muslim modernist movements of the early 20th-century,
a particularly sensitive issue for the authorities. Under her
leadership, the institute became more dynamic: Alimova
developed contacts with foreign countries, had researchers
participate in international conferences, attempted to
revivepublication, and tried to narrow the lack of specialists
in medieval and ancient history, specializing in the
recruitment of PhD candidates in these disciplines, which
require the mastery of manuscripts.1
Within the human sciences, some seem to be more
constrained by the political authorities than others. History
is obviously one of the most controlled disciplines. During
the Soviet period, the study of contemporary times, the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, was especially marked
by Marxist assumptions. Historians wishing to distance
themselves from these schemas took refuge in ancient
history, even if it too was not free from overtones. Today in
Uzbekistan, the situation is little changed. Contemporary
history remains most beholden to the wishes of the
authorities. Sociology, almost forbidden, is as bothersome
because it examines social mechanisms whose practical
and symbolic scope may potentially offend those in power.
History and sociology are suspected of highlighting polit-
ical processes, such as the development of new social
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poor, and foreseeing the rise of popular discontent based on
deteriorating standards of living. The political authorities
are particularly gripped with these issues. Religious and
ethnic issues are particularly sensitive, too, and those in
power assume that research on this topic could generate
inter-ethnic or inter-religious tensions among the
population.
Other areas of study are also strictly controlled. Arche-
ology has become highly strategic, as only it can conﬁrm or
deny the presence of ancient Uzbek people on their current
territory and attribute to them the brilliant sedentary
civilizations that developed in the famed Bactria and
Sogdiana. Required to discover tangible physical evidence
of the presence of the ancient nation on its contemporary
soil, archaeology has found itself at the service of the
national goals of the political authorities. Commemorations
never seem to stop coming: the 660 years of Tamerlane in
1996, 2500 years of Bukhara and Khiva in 1997, and 2500
years in Tashkent in 2009. Any political or scientiﬁc work
must comment on the unique ancient lineage of the
country. As mentioned in the UNESCO volume on the
history of Uzbekistan, “Uzbekistan is a country of ancient
and original story, whose peoples have contributed much
to world history. The territory of Uzbekistan is one of the
sources of development of the original man (Shirinov,
Anarbaev, & Buriakov, 1993).”
Ethnology also remains one of the reigning sciences of
nationhood. In this time of construction of nation states,
governments of Central Asia attach a tetchy pride to the
scientiﬁc explanation of their unique origins. When
historical sources are lacking, only ethnological analysis can
identify the arguments justifying national and state conti-
nuity. The task is thus to establish indisputable foundations
for the preeminence of the Uzbek people over other
national groups in their titular state and to justify the
continuation of ethnic and linguistic policies. The assertion
of the continuity, not only of the Uzbek people, but also of
their national consciousness since time immemorial, is
scholarly supported by the Soviet tradition of ethnogenesis
(etnogenez). This discipline was formed in the 1940s and
has continued to dominate the discipline of ethnology
without ever questioning its very primordialist founding
premise: once formed, national identity imposes itself as an
immutable phenomenon on the individual, not allowing for
multiple afﬁliations.
Three major constituent features of Soviet ethnology
continue to persist in Uzbekistan. First, the ethnologist is
only empowered to explain his own culture or, if necessary,
that of the “traditional” ethnic minorities of his republic,
especially if he actually belongs to one of these communi-
ties. The colonial context of the birth of ethnology on the
peoples of Central Asia, sought by the Czarist and Soviet
regimes, and its close links with “regional science” (krae-
vedenie) are completely ignored and never discussed,
bringing in their wake lack of awareness of ethnocentrism.
Instead, the tradition according to which all cultures have
an internal and natural coherence, its elements held
together by a spirit, genius, or a national ideal that an
outsider could never grasp except through empathy
maintains a strong presence in Central Asia. Only Uzbekscould be able to study Uzbeks. The differential treatment
between titular peoples and national minorities is also
never explained, as it seems evident that each can only
comment on things that are culturally related to his group.
Thus, the Central Asian ethnologist would have neither the
conceptual means nor the scientiﬁc legitimacy to make
judgments about otherness or create comparative research.
Next, post-Soviet Uzbek ethnology remains often igno-
rant of any current situation. The ethnologist is thought of
as a historian who works on a particular people, for which
he seeks to demonstrate unique speciﬁcity in comparison
to their neighbors and to explore the most traditional
cultural elements without regard to the contemporary
period. Almost at no time is it, for example, appropriate to
study the impact of social changes introduced by the Soviet
system on “Uzbekness”. Almost no work focuses on how
traditional clans have reinvested in various contemporary
professions, transforming old solidarity ties into patronage
networks. While Western anthropology grew in the second
half of the twentieth century on researching the distant and
exotic as well as the ultra-contemporary and modern, no
similar pattern has become evident in Uzbekistan. It seems
that any social approach has been devalued by the exces-
sive ideological investment during Soviet times around
these issues, giving a distorted view today of what could be
the study of urban life or kolkhozes.
Finally, ethnology is conﬁned to the study of what is
traditionally valued. Often based on solid empirical ground,
it focuses on material culturedhabitats, costumes, crafts,
folklore, rituals, and ceremoniesdbypassing more ideo-
logical subjects in promoting the study of retraditionalized
phenomena. Notwithstanding the discourse on disciplinary
renewal and removal from the Soviet-Russian sphere,
denounced as condescending virgule the vast majority of
Uzbek contemporary work is based on Russian sources
from the second half of the nineteenth century and the
early twentieth century. Russian ethnography from the last
century remains one of the primary sources of inspiration
for research on Uzbekness.The Soviet tradition of ethnogenesis
Developed in the 1930s and 1940s, ethnogenesis is
deﬁned as the process of ethnic emergence of a speciﬁc
people over centuries. One of the fundamental issues that
ethnology, whether Soviet or post-Soviet, continuously
seeks to address is that of autochthony: how to combine the
territory-based, Stalinist precepts deﬁning the nation with
a historical reality of signiﬁcant population migration in the
steppe area that was maintained until the sixteenth or
seventeenth century. During the Soviet period, the recog-
nition of national administrative status signiﬁed recognition
of a territory. This equation, at the expense of the Austro-
Marxist principle of individual national-cultural autonomy,
crystallized the idea of a necessary overlap between the
community and territory. The writings of national history
have therefore sought to demonstrate at any cost the ancient
anchor between a space and its eponymous people (Laruelle,
2008). Thepost-Soviet perioddid nothing to seek exceptions
to this tradition and instead tried to strengthen it.
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Yakubovsky (1886-1953) published a brochure entitled The
Question of the Ethnogenesis of the Uzbek People. It traces the
Uzbek ethnogenesis not to the sixteenth century and the
Shaybanids,2 but to the tenth century, with the arrival of
Turkic peoples and their settlement under the Kara-Khanid
dynasty, which concluded the brilliant early ethnogenesis
of the Uzbeks (Yu. Yakubovskii, 1941). The focus on the idea
of a particularly ancient Uzbek ethnogenesis continued in
the 1960s through the main ﬁgure of Uzbek ethnology,
Karim Shaniazov, who established the link between the
Soviet and post-Soviet periods. He defended his candidate’s
thesis in 1960, and doctoral dissertation in 1975. Beginning
in 1967, or just after the arrival of Yulian Bromley to
Miklukho-Maklai Institute in Moscow, Shaniazov was
appointed head of the ethnology section of the Institute of
History of the Uzbek SSR. From 1990, he led the “scientiﬁc
study group on ethnic processes and the ethnogenesis of
the Uzbeks” and directed all Ph.D. on ethnology at the
Institute. He was also the only ethnologist to be a member
of the Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan and until his
death in 2000, continued to publish on the issue of national
ethnogenesis.3
Shaniazov began his scientiﬁc career with a monograph,
The Uzbek-Karluks: A Historical-Ethnographic Essay, which
studied the Karluks, an ethnic group constituting of Uzbeks
that is particularly present in the Bukhara region. His
interest in this group, besides the fact he was a member of
it, stemmed from the age of the ethnonym. The ﬁrst
mention of Karluks came in the texts of the Yenisei and
ancient Chinese sources. Shaniazov tried to interpret the
data in the ancient writings from the Karluk dynasty, then
switched to more classic ethnographic descriptiondthe
economy, material culture, social and familial structure,
traditions, and ritualsdof the Karluk community, ﬁnally
commenting on the size of this group according to Czarist
and Soviet censuses. He welcomed the arrival in the
seventh century of the current Karluks in Uzbekistan,
particularly in the Fergana Valley, and their rapid settle-
ment (Shaniiazov, 1964). For these two elements, Shania-
zov returned to the central question of the date of the
Uzbek ethnogenesis and hoped to prove that it crystallized
a few centuries before the date proposed by Yakubovsky.
The possible discontinuity between the community called
the Karluks in the ﬁrst centuries of the Common Era and
those claiming the label at the turn of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries is never posited.
Shaniazov continued his research in the 1970s and
1980s with numerous articles and a book. Published in
1974, For an Ethnic History of the Uzbek People is still
considered a standard reference. The author of its preface,
the ethnographer T. A. Zhdanko, quoted Bromley: “It is in
the process of ethnogenesis that since ancient and2 The Uzbek dynasty established in Transoxiana in the early sixteenth
century under the leadership of Shaybani Khan (1451–1510). Its leaders
originally belonged to a nomadic population from the eastern territory of
the Golden Horde, taking its name from Uzbek Khan, who reigned from
1312 to 1342.
3 For a short obituary biography, see Obshchestvennye nauki v Uzbe-
kistane, no. 6, 2000, pp. 69–70.medieval times has formed the majority of ethnic facial
features of a people, which in the future will characterize
its national speciﬁcity and differentiate it fromother ethnos
(Shaniiazov, 1974).” Once again, Shaniazov presented an
ethnic reality that he interpreted as stable over time and
that can be objectively described and explained, and
suggests that ethnology serves to demonstrate the speci-
ﬁcity that makes each people an unique entity. In this work,
Shaniazov focused speciﬁcally on Kipchaks, which along
with the Karluks and Oghuz were traditionally appre-
hended as ethnic groups made up of future Uzbeks. The
value of the Kipchaks lies in the fact that they are
mentioned in Arabic sources from the eighth and ninth
centuries. By cross-referencing between data sources and
ancient philological, etymological, and geographical infor-
mation, Shaniazov considered the Kipchaks a part of what
he called the “indigenous people” of South Siberia (Sha-
niiazov, 1974). He argued that although medieval sources
indicated the arrival of the western Kipchaks on the
present-day territory of Uzbekistan only in the ﬁfteenth
century, they neglected to mention the existence of eastern
Kipchaks, who were present since the tenth century. The
fundamentally ethnocentric vision of this narrative then
reemerges: the ethnogenesis of Kazakhs and Karakalpaks
probably only dates from the ﬁfteenth century, at the time
of the arrival of these nomadic Kipchaks (Shaniiazov, 1974),
but the “main features of the ethnic Uzbek nationality”
would go back to the tenth century (Shaniiazov, 1974).
National honor is therefore preserved and the Uzbek
speciﬁcity among its Central Asian neighbors, reafﬁrmed.
Uzbekistan’s independence did not constitute a rupture
in the intellectual oeuvre of Shaniazov or its institutional
status. The ethnographer pursued his research on ethnic
groups and the constituent dynasties of Uzbek identity; his
appointment as an academician made known the authori-
ties’ validation of his discourse. Even before 1991, Shaniazov
incorporated the ideaddeveloped discretely in the 1970s
and now regarded as a tenet of the science in Uzbekis-
tandof a ﬁrst substrate of Turkic people throughout the
Central Asian area dating from the second millennium BC,
before the arrival of Indo-Europeans in the area. In
a monograph, The Kang State and People, (Shaniiazov, 1990)
published in 1990 in Uzbek, Shaniazov denied that the
Turkic khaganat announced the arrival of Turkic peoples in
the region and thus foreshadowed the ﬁrst national
dynasty. According to him, the Uzbeks were born from the
merger of two different “roots,” the historically attested
waves of Turkic peoples and those already on the Central
Asian territory. Central Asian populations mentioned in
ancient sources, like the Scythians, are therefore retro-
spectively equated with the Turks; this original national
“root” could obviously not be Persian-speaking and must
have already been Turkic. Shaniazov put particular
emphasis on the Kang dynasty, which arrived in the region
from southern Siberia and Jungaria in the fourth millen-
nium BC and founded a state there in the second and ﬁrst
millennia BC.
In a 1998 article, “Some Theoretical Questions about the
Ethnogenesis of the Uzbek People,” Shaniazov returns to
the question of a founding dynasty for the Uzbeks. From the
ﬁrst words of the piece he expresses the idea that
Marlène Laruelle / Journal of Eurasian Studies 1 (2010) 102–110106“everyone has the right to know the ethnogenesis and
ethnic history of his people”4 and that it is natural that
these issues have attracted renewed interest after the
independence. The argument is openly about identity more
than strictly scientiﬁc. Even if he retained many references
to Soviet scholars, Shaniazov sought to embed in the
contemporary rhetoric rejection of the Soviet legacy and
afﬁrmation of the sole right of Uzbeks to write their own
ethnogenesis. He criticized scholars “from the center
[Moscow]”whowould have preserved the imperial Russian
approach and would not have been able to develop
a scientiﬁc discourse on the ethnos valid for all peoples of
the Soviet Union. Despite this denial, Shaniazov never
replaced the Soviet discourse. He took up the Bromley’s
classic deﬁnition of ethnos, which insists on the unity of
language, territory, culture, and historical destiny. He also
afﬁrmed the classiﬁcation of all people along a single time
line, onwhich evolution proceeds from tribe, to nationality,
to the nation (in Uzbek kablia, èlat, andmillat). He began his
chronology of the ethnos in exactly the same historical
period as those presented during the Soviet period, which
speaks of the various stages of slavery, feudalism, capi-
talism, and socialism (Shaniiazov, 1998).
The arguments advanced by Shaniazov imply an ethnic
stability that nothing could disrupt. The two founding
elements of the ethnos remain language and territory.
According to him, nomadic peoples, who often change
location, would not be able to bypass the tribal stage. This
serves as a means to disparage the neighboring Kazakhs,
Karakalpaks, and Turkmens, emphasizing the speciﬁcally
sedentary nature of the Uzbek-Tajik space. Thus, the terri-
torial continuity between Karluks, Kara-Khanids, and
Uzbeks aims to reveal the early nature of Uzbek ethno-
genesis compared to peoples such as the Oghuz, who had
not ceased changing territory, giving rise to the Seljuks, the
Ottomans, and then the Turkmens. This will to anchor in
history the existence of a sedentary Turkicness virtually
ignores the presence of Persian-speaking populations, who
are only mentioned as allusions and who are stripped of
their indigenous status (Shaniiazov, 1998). According to
Shaniazov, one of the peculiarities of the Uzbek ethno-
genesis is indeed its immutability, which was over-
shadowed by the late appearance of the Uzbek ethnonym
in the sixteenth century (Shaniiazov, 1998, p. 40). He thus
tried to justify why the Uzbek nation failed to impose its
ethnonym but would have already existed without it.
Therein is the essentialist idea that ethnic consciousness is
precedent to the state.
Shaniazov built on this reading of history in a book
published in 2001, after his death, The Processes of Formation
of the UzbekNation (Shaniiazov, 2001). This book is regarded
in the local scholarly community as a standard reference of
post-Soviet Uzbek science. Shaniazov’s uncontested proﬁle
and the fact that he ﬁnished this book on his deathbed
explains the emotion surrounding the piece, the desire to4 We are extremely grateful to Khudaikul Ibragimov and Ulughbek S.
Mansurov for having this text translated from Uzbek into Russian. In any
case, the opinions presented here cannot be attributed to them
(Shaniiazov, 1998).disseminate widely, and the decision of the Institute of
History to translate it into Russian. In an introduction
dedicated to President Karimov, the author stresses the
need to return to national roots in order to build the future
of the new state; by not fairly assessing the signiﬁcance of
the past, one would then take the risk of debasing Uzbek
culture and underestimating its age (Shaniiazov, 2001). The
book includes an outline of historical discourse that Sha-
niazov developed throughout his career and seeks to put
forward a ﬁnal summary of the discussion on the history of
the nation, with chapters ranging chronologically from
ancient times to the nineteenth century.
The historian-ethnologist ﬁrst reafﬁrms the presence in
Central Asia of Turkic peoples before the arrival of the ﬁrst
Indo-Europeans and interpreted the state of Kang in the
ﬁrst millennium BC as “the ﬁrst Turkic population in the
region (Shaniiazov, 2001, p.10).”He praises its early culture,
and obviously its sedentary nature, endowing it with
borders stretching from the Urals to the Syr Darya and
a political center in the present day region of Shymkent.
The Kang ethnos formed at that time was born of assimi-
lation by the Turkic peoplesdalways presented as
“absorbing” and never “being absorbed”dwith other
peoples present on the territory, such as Bactrians and
Sogdians. Shaniazov subsequently stresses the national
afﬁliation between Karluks and Kara-Khanids, and assumes
the transformation of the leaders of Karluks, who called
themselves “great khans”, into “Kara-Khanids (Shaniiazov,
2001).” The ethnic continuity of Uzbeks and of an Uzbek
state seems therefore going from the ﬁrst century BC until
the arrival of Russians in Central Asia.
The continuity of the work of Shaniazov and the ofﬁcial
character of his discourse reveals how current research on
the ethnogenesis of the Uzbeks has never called into
question the founding assumptions developed under Sta-
lin: searching for the oldest possible existence of a national
consciousness and afﬁrming its continuity on the territory
over time. D.F. Khashimova, who defended in 1997 her
doctorate on The Study of Ethnic History and the Ethnogenesis
of the Uzbek People in the National Historiography (second
half of the nineteenth to the twentieth century), followed the
discourse of her thesis advisor, Karim Shaniazov. Her
research seeks to prove the perfect overlap of data from
various sciences toward a single goal, demonstrating the
ancient existence of Uzbeks as a constituted nation. Thus
“historians, ethnographers, archaeologists, anthropolo-
gists, linguists, and numismatists.arrive at similar
conclusions on the issue of the indigenous origin (avtokh-
tonnoe proiskhozhdenie) and formation of the Uzbek people
(Khashimova, 1997, p. 10).” The references to Soviet science
remain unchanged, based on the notoriety of the historians
Yakubovsky and S.P. Tolstov, archaeologists A.A. Askarov
and B.A. Litvinski, anthropologists L.V. Oshanin, V.N.
Zezenkova and T.K. Khodzhaiov.
D.F. Khashimova is content to resume the connections
drawn from several decades of Soviet Uzbek scholarship,
giving them a character that allows them to ﬁt into the new
political situation created by the events of 1991. However,
with the exception of reference to independence, the
discourse has barely changed. According to her, academic
research must demonstrate the falsity of the assumption of
5 “Nationalities” recognized in the Soviet census beneﬁted from
cultural and linguistic rights via their administrative status, which the
central government bestowed on them. The post-Soviet Central Asian
states have continued this tradition of ofﬁcially developing national
diversity, proudly boasting of “more than a hundred nationalities.”
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steppes in the early centuries of the Common Era. The
conviction that the ethnic consciousness directly and tele-
ologically precedes state formation is never questioned.
Thus, “today, historiography and the ethnic history of the
Uzbek people give scientiﬁc and cognitive, political and
practical meaning: the knowledge of multi-century
national-ethnic development is the key to understanding
the normative (zakonomernyj) and gradual character of
contemporary processes of national rebirth, the sources of
people’s faith in the path that was chosen (Khashimova,
1997, p. 5).” The majority of Uzbek researchers have not
understood independence to be an invitation to rethink
patterns of narrative on the nation. It has not led to new
theoretical or methodological questions, instead strength-
ening previous schools of thought that are always consid-
ered to be relevant.
The Karakalpakstan subsidiary of the Academy of
Sciences, based in Nukus, also tries to respond to these
demands by adapting them to its particular situation. Thus,
the collective research project of the Modern History
Department focuses on “the formation of the Karakalpak
people,” concentrating on autochthonous issues. Did the
Karakalpaks constitute a people before their arrival on their
present territory or during their merger with populations
that were already present? Beginning to discuss the issue in
1998, they have held a conference in Nukus (1999) on “the
Aralian knot of the ethnogenetic process.” The brochure
issued by the Karakalpak subsidiary that same year
contains two small pieces from local researchers. The ﬁrst,
by S.K. Kamalov, is a reviewof a Turkish bookwhose author,
Ziya Kurter, afﬁrms that Karakalpaks have possessed a state
since the ﬁfth century and that their ethnogenesis dates
from the tenth and eleventh centuries; the second, by I.V.
Piskunov, focuses more precisely on anthropological
aspects of the Karakalpak ethnogenesis and goes as far as to
talk of its “racial genesis” (rasogenez).
The ethnic atlas of Uzbekistan, a methodological and
disciplinary controversy
Published by the Soros Foundation in 2002, The Ethnic
Atlas of Uzbekistan did not correspond to the prevailing
ofﬁcial norms on ethnicity and sought to import
a constructivist view on the issue, provoking ﬁerce political
and scientiﬁc controversy in a country where public intel-
lectual life is sclerotic and academic publications, rare.
These debates offer insight into the degree of politicization
of the ethnological discipline and the deeply embedded
nature of Soviet schemas in academic practices and
discourse. Through them one can measure the impact of an
increasingly static political environment on the develop-
ment of science in Uzbekistan, as in neighboring Central
Asian republics. The Ethnic Atlas was commissioned by the
Open Society Institute, which the American businessman
George Soros funds. The editor, Alisher Ilkhamov, a sociol-
ogist by training specializing in economic issues, particu-
larly agriculture, was the executive director of the Open
Society Institute Assistance Foundation in Uzbekistan
during the writing of the book. It was published in Istanbul,
rather than Tashkent, in order to ensure better editing.Although censorship was ofﬁcially abolished in 2003, the
authorities still retain the right to review all forthcoming
titles in the country. The book was distributed for free in
the capital, like all Soros Foundation publications, and was
posted on unofﬁcial websites .
The book, which was edited by Uzbek scholars, seeks to
evaluate the nationality situation in Uzbekistan in
a descriptive way. Divided into two main parts, the ﬁrst
alphabetically lists about seventy peoples living in the
country and the second is devoted solely to the Uzbek
people. The book contains almost no suspicion about
national minorities and, except for the Tajiks, carefully
avoidsdirect commenton their contemporary situation. The
authors presented not only the “traditional,” or indigenous,
peoples of the country (Dungans, Bukharian Jews, Kar-
akalpaks, Kazakhs, and Uyghurs), but also those from the
Sovietworld (Russians, Poles,Germans, andArmenians) and
Westerners (scholars of the nineteenth century who trav-
eled to the region and contemporary NGO representatives).
Contrary to what the title suggests, the book is not an atlas,
as it features few maps, but a dictionary of the “nationali-
ties”5 of Uzbekistan. The use of the term “ethnicity” is
equally questionable because it falls under the category of
“national minorities” as traditionally deﬁned in Soviet time.
However, the fundamental issue of the Atlas does not
involve the historiographical treatment of the country’s
national diversity, but its writing on the history of Uzbeks.
After the scandal that emerged, the Soros Foundation,
which had been in the country since 1996, failed to earn
renewed registration at the Ministry of Justice and was
forced to close on March 1, 2004. Its website is no longer
accessible from Tashkent, many scholars who participated
in various projects of the Soros Foundation were put on
black lists, and salaries of foundation employees were
blocked by the National Bank of Uzbekistan. The scope of
the controversy only becomes understandable if put into
a wider political context. In Georgia, the Soros Foundation
may have contributed to the fall of President Eduard She-
vardnadze during the “color revolution” in the fall of 2003
and the subsequent election of Mikhail Saakashvili. This
situation was particularly frowned upon in Uzbekistan,
where the ruling elites became concerned about attempts
to support the destabilization of Karimov’s regime. In
a speech read on the main Uzbek television channel on
April 30, 2004, President Karimov justiﬁed the closure of
the Soros Foundation, accusing it of having engaged in
illegal activities as well as making discreet mention of the
controversy related to the Atlas. “There have been very
serious attempts [by Soros] to mobilize splinter elements of
the population. For example, on the issue of interethnic
relations, they began to distribute publications and trans-
lations on the issue of interethnic relations. Fromwhere are
the Uzbeks derived, from where do the Tajiks come, etc.
These editions, books, newspapers have no basis and
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spoken and said that. But their main objective.was to
choose representatives of the Uzbek intelligentsia who
could support them tomorrow and.go up against the
constitutional order.”6
This debate, hitherto internal within Uzbekistan, has
reached Russia. Russian ethnologists are indeed also
divided between proponents of a constructivist reading of
the discipline and defenders of the Soviet tradition of
ethnology centered on a primordial reading of “ethnic
processes.” Yulian Bromley’s successor as the director of the
Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology in Moscow, Valery
Tishkov, has tried for several years to change this disci-
plinary tradition of submission to history, political objec-
tives, and major Soviet-era standard texts. The frontal
character of the controversy surrounding the Ethnic Atlas
enabled him bring into the internal debates in Russia
favorable arguments and opportunities to criticize his
opponents. Proponents of a constructivist analysis decided
to publish the controversial texts in the leading journal of
Russian ethnology, Etnologicheskoe Obozrenie (successor to
the famous Sovetskaja Etnograﬁja), in order to contextualize
the debates around the Atlas.7 Prohibited in Uzbekistan, the
scientiﬁc debates continued over the Internet and then in
Russia, thanks to the drive of Russian ethnologists to prove
the existence of a pluralistic debate on the ethnic issue,
recognizing the right of various opinions to equal access to
the public.
In Uzbekistan, the discussions took the form of a meth-
odological and political controversy to assert the issue of
the Uzbek nationhood. The accusations against the Ethnic
Atlas came from the Institute of History of Uzbekistan,
which has conventionally headed ethnographic research,
since the Soviet tradition left no margin for autonomy to
ethnology, considered an auxiliary science of history. Since
the fall of 2003, important debates on the Ethnic Atlas have
emerged in the electronic journal Etno-Zhurnal, written by
Sh. Kamoliddin, an Arabist by training and program
manager at the History Institute of the Academy of
Sciences. A long article in the very ofﬁcial Pravda Vostoka
followed on January 14–15, 2004, signed by Dilorom Ali-
mova, director of the Institute of History, Zoia Arifkhanova,
head of the Ethnology Department, and Kamoliddin.
Members of the Institute of History involved in this
controversy, well aware that a critique published in
a newspaper as ofﬁcial as Pravda Vostoka made their posi-
tion appear political rather than scholarly, tried to ground
the internal debate in academic circles. In April 2004, they
republished the same article (with slight changes) in the
leading history journal of Uzbekistan, O’zbekiston Tarihi.
The director of the Soros Foundation in Uzbekistan and
main person embroiled in the affair, Alisher Ilkhamov,
attempted to address these various criticisms, but Pravda
Vostoka refused to publish his response.8 He then defended
his own cause in two papers published online in Etno-6 Channel One, April 30, 2004.
7 Etnograﬁcheskoe obozrenie, no. 1, 2005.
8 The informant wished to remain anonymous, interview conducted in
Tashkent, February 19, 2004.Zhurnal and on the website of the Soros Foundation in
Uzbekistan, before its closure.
In “Objectivity and Accountability: That Which Should
Not Be the Ethnic Atlas of Uzbekistan,” Alimova, Arifkha-
nova, and Kamoliddin organize an ordered refutation of the
work. They begin by criticizing the alphabetic nationality
entries and the ambiguity of certain terms, such as the use
of “ethnic minorities,” considered in the Soviet tradition to
be derogatory. “Ethnic groups” would be their preferred
term of art. They challenge the failure of what they consider
the rules governing ethnographic research, which require
the systematic description of the ethno-demographic
characteristics, speciﬁc culture, lifestyle, material culture,
and ritualsdin that orderdof each ethnic group
mentioned. The arguments, however, quickly become
political. The “Tajik” entry describes the evident
throughout the twentieth century process of Uzbekization
as forced assimilation of Tajiks. Alimova asserts to the
contrary, in accordance with ofﬁcial discourse, that it is
a natural process of symbiosis between Tajik and Turkic
peoples who existed for centuries, and notes the would-be
increasing number of schools, and television and radio
programs available in the Tajik language. Once past these
criticisms, all modest and some well founded, the actual
subject of the controversy appears: the historical discourse
on the Uzbeks themselves, not the national minorities.
Ilkhamov, who is the sole author of the sections dealing
with the Uzbeks, openly calls into question the mode of
writing of national ethnogenesis that has been de rigueur
for over half a century. He refers to the theories of
constructivism developed in the West, the idea that the
nation is a political, intellectual, and state construct, cites
the “imagined communities” of Benedict Anderson, and
says it would be “naïve to depict the formation of Uzbek
nation as a natural and objective historical process (Ilkha-
mov, 2002).” He devotes an entire chapter to the
construction of national identity during the Soviet period,
placing special emphasis on the territorial division and
establishment of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR)
in 1924, recalling the ediﬁcation of a codiﬁed literary
language based on only one Uzbek dialect, and mentioning
three major political forces that had an interest in devel-
oping an Uzbek national consciousness (the Jadids, the
national Communists of the 1920s and 1930s before their
liquidation during the Stalinist purges, and the party
apparatus). Ilkhamov does not hide his rejection of ofﬁcial
historiography on issues of ethnogenesis, accusing the
Soviet classics of contributing to the “canonization of the
Uzbek national history” (Ilkhamov, 2002) and turning the
story into teleology of the nation. He notes above all that
one of the fundamental ambiguities of Soviet ethnology,
the confusion between the ethnos and the nation, causes
many epistemological errors. When putting the Atlas
online, Ilkhamov restated his conviction: “The notion of
ethnogenesis seems not to fully reﬂect [reality] as it draws
from the arsenal of the biological sciences, representing
social processes such as natural historical phenomena,
where the will of individuals, institutions, authorities,
groups, and especially the elites, in short, social issues
remain outside the framework of analysis (Ilkhamov,
2004).”
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outcry from ofﬁcial circles, which the main ﬁgures from the
Institute of History echoed. In the Soviet tradition, the
arguments of their opponent Ilkhamov were not regarded
as different, but as “unscientiﬁc,”(Alimova, Arifkhanova, &
Kamoliddin, 2004) a term that crops up regularly
throughout the articles published on the subject. The many
references made by Ilkhamov to Western anthropology,
discretely implying its theoretic superiority, shocked the
Uzbek academic realm, which has limited access to the
Western texts in question. As Alimova and her colleagues
stated, “[Ilkhamov’s] design is based on the theory, widely
distributed in Western anthropology, of constructivism,
which is far from being recognized as sound by the
ethnological community since constructivism denies the
existence of ethnic communities as objective realities and
recognizes only ethnic characteristics constructed by men
as a function of circumstances. As such, the formation of the
Uzbek nation is understood not as a natural historical
process, but as the result of a political construction
(Alimova, Arifkhanova, & Kamoliddin, 2004).”
In the February 2004 article in Etno-Zhurnal, Kamoliddin
continues thesemethodological considerations and focuses
on accusations related to sociology. It seems to him that
ethnogenesis “cannot be understood through popular
sociological theories, but primarily by the principle of
historicism (Kamoliddin, 2004).” Thus only the historian
would have the adequate institutional competence to
consider ethnic processes. Sociology could indeed “be
useful for communities recently formed or being consti-
tuted on the territory of other nations, but cannot explain
the history of peoples whose national formation occurred
on the basis of an autochthonous population. (Kamoliddin,
2004)” This criticism of sociology is even more powerful as
the discipline is almost nonexistent today in Uzbekistan.
The Sociology Department of the Institute of History has
been suppressed since 1993; Ilkhamov’s training as a soci-
ologist is therefore considered politically suspect. Ilkhamov
replied to Kamoliddin that the national phenomena must
be studied from a multidisciplinary perspective and not be
the sole domain of ethnologists. He also criticized the
accusation that he did not take into account the classic
ethnographic themes and explained that politics, the elites,
the authorities, and the state are also relevant for under-
standing the national consciousness (Ilkhamov, 2003).
This controversy may be interpreted as a disciplinary
struggle. The Institute of History refused to see the ethno-
logical ﬁeld escape from its jurisdiction and be gradually
taken over by researchers from sociology. By taking on
national issues as research questions, sociologists encroach
on territory considered in the Soviet tradition to be the very
object of the ethnological discipline, the reason being its
object of study and not its speciﬁc methods. The director of
the Institute of History conﬁrmed this reading, saying that
“it is the Institute of History that should have published this
Atlas”9 and that it is unacceptable that the Soros Founda-
tion had not consulted with researchers from the Institute9 Interview with D. Alimova, Institute of History, Tashkent, February 19,
2004.or, as in the Soviet scientiﬁc tradition, given the manuscript
for comments to a group of specialists. The book was not
overseen by academics licensed on ethnic issues and the
Institute of History was basically boycotted, although
several Atlas authors were members of it. “No recognized
ethnologists of Uzbekistan were aware of the preparation
of this publication” (Alimova, Arifkhanova, & Kamoliddin,
2004). Anyway, according to Alimova, the sociologists are
not allowed to encroach on a subject not belonging to them,
making Ilkhamov a “dilettante” in the subject. The potency
of the controversy is due in part to the especially difﬁcult
situation of contemporary Uzbek ethnology. The Institute
of History is in the paradoxical situation of having in its
possession one of the most sensitive areas of local scholarly
life, a long and proud tradition of reﬂection on the subject,
and pressure from political authorities in search of intel-
lectual justiﬁcation, a nearly impossible request due to the
lack of positions. A book written by a sociologist supported
by Western institutions, namely the Soros Foundation, can
then only be seen as a kind of intellectual and disciplinary
thief.
One of the main topics of debate is related to the legit-
imacy of nationhood. Kamoliddin accused Ilkhamov of
implying that the Turkic peoples have always been inher-
ently nomadic, whereas precisely the Uzbek historiography
is based on the appropriation of a prestigious sedentary
past. He thinks that “ancient Turks were the ﬁrst inhabi-
tants of Central Asia and constitute a part of the indigenous
people of the region” (Kamoliddin, 2003). According to
him, archeology has proven the existence of a large
sedentary culture in this area from the second millennium
BC, even before the arrival of Indo-Europeans, and Kamo-
liddin obviously wants to attribute this ﬁrst civilization to
Turks. “The latest toponymic and linguistic studies allow
one to suppose that in the second millennium BC, the
Dravidian-speaking peoples lived in close proximity and
interaction with the proto-Turkic peoples, and these ties
were broken by the ﬂood of Indo-European arrivals”
(Kamoliddin, 2003). It is therefore for him quite legitimate
to state that “proto-Turks were the ﬁrst inhabitants of this
region and constituted a part of its ancient pre-Indo-
European population”.
The formation of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic in
1924, which Ilkhamov considered the founding event of the
titular nation, cannot be understood by his opponents as
a fundamental turning point in Uzbek history. They prefer
to continue a teleological reading of Soviet discourse by
presenting this as a simple and modest “step in the Turkic-
Uzbek statehood,” which has had many different state
entities since antiquity. The Institute of History not only has
an explicit negative position on the constructivist school, to
which Ilkhamov refers, but updates the old Soviet critics,
dating from the 1940s and 1950s, against presenting the
Shaybanid dynasty as the rupture in the history of Uzbe-
kistan. This would-be return by Ilkhamov to the sixteenth
century is seen as an insult to the nation, whose national
consciousness could not be so recent. The main accusation
reveals the inherent affective and symbolic character of the
attack against the Atlas: “By their anti-scientiﬁc views and
preconceptions, these people [Western scholars and people
close to them, like Ilkhamov] try to depict the Uzbeks and
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pastoralists, immigrants and conquerors without any
cultural traditions in the region. It is therefore necessary
[for carrying out scientiﬁc research] to reject certain
stereotypes rooted in historical science and misrepresen-
tations of the role of the Turkic peoples in history”
(Alimova, Arifkhanova, & Kamoliddin, 2004).
Conclusions
The unexpected scope of the controversy surrounding
twenty pages summarizing the construction of the modern
Uzbek nation reveals the depth of interactions between the
political realm and academic discourse, which already was
mainstream when ethnology was thought by the Soviet
authorities to be a justiﬁcation for their nationality policies.
The fact that these pages were ﬁnanced by a Western
foundation regarded by the Uzbek authorities as highly
politicized has poisoned the scientiﬁc debate. The under-
lying political motives are obvious; the Ethnic Atlas was
only a pretext for the closure of the Soros Foundation.
However, the criticisms orchestrated against it should not
only be apprehended as a simple command of the ruling
power; inﬁghting among local academics is real. The quasi
ban of sociology in contemporary Uzbekistan and
condemnation of theories as being constructivist, precisely
because they “come from the West,” illustrates the main-
tenance of essentialist schemes that were a part of Soviet
humanities.
The issues are also internal to post-Soviet science, now
partly divided between an old guard formed in the 1960s
and younger generations, some of which are eager to
embrace Western views when they are available, which is
hardly the case in Uzbekistan. The academics are also split
by the ﬁnancial challenges that contemporary research
faces today. Researchers who have managed to join
Western institutions or obtain funds ﬁnd themselves
obtaining salaries much higher than those given by the
Uzbek state, but are exposed to their colleagues’ reactions,
which combine material envy and a sense of betrayal
towards the national community. The very small number of
scientiﬁc publications appearing in Uzbekistan exacerbates
the problem; the visibility of the Ethnic Atlas in an almost
non-existent editorial environment then increases it
tenfold. These conﬂicts, however, are not only generational
or material, they also divide the researchers according to
their perception of the social role they have played or play
in the post-Soviet political changes for almost two decades.
Some believe that the demise of the Soviet Union does not
necessitate a questioning of its intellectual legacy, while
others feel they must link these two phenomena and
therefore challenge Soviet precepts on the national
question.
Whether the perspective given on the issue of collective
identity is based on “constructivist” or “primordialist”
assumptions, the authors involved in this controversy arewell aware of the high degree of politicization of the
subject. Both the Institute of History, which felt compelled
to offer a scientiﬁc argument for political will, and the Soros
Foundation, which could go against the ofﬁcial view of
national history, are voluntarily and involuntarily
committed to issues beyond the humanities and social
sciences. Uzbekistan, like its post-Soviet neighbors, has
combined political issues and the national question. The
difﬁculty in accepting the failure of a contemporary
democratic Central Asia emerging from the Soviet experi-
ence seems to be associatedwith a stiffening of conceptions
of nationhood. The discursive inﬂation suffered by the
national theme then reveals how it is perceived by the
ruling circles as the only possible ideological escape and is
thought, rightly or wrongly, as able to avoid any reconsid-
eration of the political system in place.References
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